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u.s. INDIAN POLICY, 1865 .. 1890 
AS ILLUMINATED THROUGH THE LIVES OF 
CHARLES A. EASTMAN AND ELAINE GOODALE EASTMAN 
GRETCHEN CASSEL EICK 
Rapid change, passionate convictions, acute 
regional differences, ethnic conflict, and an 
army looking for a mission characterized the 
United States from 1865 to 1890. The Civil 
War was over and most of the soldiers had 
mustered out and gone home. The others 
were assigned either to the South to oversee 
reconstruction or, the larger number of them, 
to the area between the Mississippi and the 
Rocky Mountains-the Great Plains. The U.S. 
Army's new mission was to "pacify" the Great 
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Plains, to protect the thousands of migrants 
enticed there by Congress's offer through the 
Homestead Act of 160 acres-free, contingent 
upon living on it and making improvements-
and by the marketing campaigns of railroads 
that promised prosperity to those who followed 
the rails. 
These twenty-five years were a watershed 
time for two regions-the South and the Great 
Plains. In the South the federal government 
would struggle with what to do with four mil-
lion freed people and shift policy frequently 
from 1865 to 1877, Washington, DC, would 
award citizenship rather than land to black 
men through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
amendments to the Constitution in 1868 and 
1870, but ultimately trade away federal gov-
ernment protection of citizenship rights for 
black Americans for Republican control of the 
White House in February 1877, three months 
after the nation's most contentious election. 
This infamous election gave home rule to 
southern states, allowing them to determine 
who voted and who didn't and to set their own 
regulations for their largest minority group 
even when those regulations violated the U.S. 
Constitution. Beginning in 1877, for the next 
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eighty years federal troops would not be dis-
patched to the South to ensure enforcement 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments' 
guarantees of equal protection, due process, 
and the right to vote to all citizens, without 
regard to color or race. 
In the Great Plains the federal govern-
ment engaged in a parallel struggle over what 
to do with 300,000 Native Americans.! That 
struggle preoccupied the Department of War, 
the Department of the Interior, Congress, and 
Indian reformers from 1865 to 1890.2 Congress 
established federal agencies in both the South 
and in the Plains to implement policy toward 
blacks and Indians, respectively: the Bureau for 
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands 
in the South and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
for the West. Ultimately the Great Plains, like 
the South, would be awarded home rule, and 
those reformers who promoted citizenship and 
assimilation as the answer to the region's mix 
of ethnic groups would be succeeded by new 
reformers and politicians ready to relegate 
Native Americans, like black Americans, to 
an inferior status unprotected by the federal 
government and at the mercy of the new west-
ern state governments. This change in Indian 
policy, however, came later than the parallel 
change in African American policy. 
In this essay I examine US. Indian policy 
from the end of the Civil War to 1890 and 
how it is illuminated by the life and writings of 
physician, author, and Indian activist Ohiyesa, 
a.k.a. Charles Alexander Eastman, and the 
author and activist he would marry in 1891, 
Elaine Goodale Eastman. 
The Eastmans experienced the US. gov-
ernment's Indian policy directly during these 
years, and both wrote extensively about their 
experiences. Ohiyesa became a refugee at age 
four when a desperate war by his Dakota nation 
against the US. in 1862 resulted in the Dakota 
being expelled from Minnesota and losing pay-
ment for the 23 million acres of land they had 
ceded by treaty to the US. He lived in desper-
ate poverty in exile in Canada for eleven years. 
He experienced the US. policy of assimila-
tion beginning at age fifteen when he moved 
to Flandreau, SD, with his father and began 
acquiring "white education" that took him east 
to university and medical school while some of 
his family members participated in the Great 
Sioux War resisting colonization. In 1890 he 
returned to the Great Plains to be the first 
Indian physician at Pine Ridge Agency where 
he experienced the Wounded Knee Massacre. 
He would later become the best known Native 
American of his era, author of eleven books 
and several dozen articles, lecturer, lobbyist, 
and civil servant. Elaine Goodale was a Euro-
American teacher living among the Lakota 
in the late 1880s. She knew participants in 
the Ghost Dance revival and Euro-American 
reformers like General Richard H. Pratt who 
started the Indian boarding school movement. 
Before and after marrying Ohiyesa/Charles 
she wrote and spoke about how Indians were 
treated and her firsthand experiences among 
the Lakota. 
This article lays out U.S. Indian policy 
toward the Great Plains during the twenty-
five years after the Civil War by examining 
chronologically specific "players" that shaped 
and reshaped that policy: the US. Army, the 
President and Interior Department, Congress, 
religious organizations, whites in the Indian 
reform movement, settlers surging west, rail-
roads, and the native nations of the Great 
Plains, particularly the Lakota. Into the narra-
tive of this changing policy the experiences of 
the Eastmans are interjected, marked in italics, 
to illustrate how this changing colonial policy 
affected those being colonized. The macro is 
intersected by the micro, as it were, to provide 
a different way of "seeing" Indian policy and its 
impact by viewing it through the eyes of these 
two people. 
GRANT'S PEACE POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN 
PLAINS 
In mid-1867, two years after the end of the 
Civil War, Congress established a commission 
of military men and civilians to make peace 
with Plains tribes and get their agreement 
to move to reservations. This U.S. Indian 
Commission would negotiate treaties with 
chiefs and select reservations for those not 
already on reservations; if they failed to secure 
peace through negotiations, Congress autho-
rized the secretary of war to suppress Indian 
hostilities with volunteer soldiers called up 
for this purpose. 3 The commission included 
the army general in charge of maintaining 
peace on the frontier, Gen. William Tecumseh 
Sherman, nationally known for his massively 
destructive march across Georgia and through 
the Carolinas in the last year of the Civil War. 
The commission negotiated a peace agreement 
with the Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, Arapaho, 
Comanche, and Cheyenne at Medicine Lodge 
Creek at Medicine Lodge in Kansas in 1868. 
The commission, however, was less success-
ful with the Lakota, the western Sioux of the 
northern Great Plains. Sioux is an umbrella 
term invented by French trappers to refer to 
the Lakota (western), Nakota (central), and 
Dakota (eastern or Santee) people who spoke 
a common language and shared a common 
culture. Deconstructed, "Sioux" means "the 
enemy," not an objective descriptor. I use 
Dakota/Lakota interchangeably with Sioux to 
refer to these people who populated the area 
from Minnesota west to the Rocky Mountains 
and from Canada south to Kansas. 
US. RELATIONS WITH NATIVE AMERICANS 
OF THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS BEFORE 
THE CIVIL WAR 
In 1851 the United States had signed a 
treaty with the Sioux, Arapaho, and Northern 
Cheyenne at Fort Laramie that specified the 
territory of each tribe and called for intertribal 
peace. In exchange for fifty years of annuity 
payments totaling $50,000, the tribes recog-
nized that the United States could build roads 
and military posts on these reservations and 
would allow the safe passage of settlers through 
their land.4 Historian Jeffrey Ostler writes that 
the Sioux had little experience with treaties, 
relied on translation by traders, and probably 
thought they were agreeing to all that had 
been said by both sides in the negotiations. 
U.S. INDIAN POLICY, 1865-1890 29 
Moreover, only three of the seven council fires 
of the Lakota/Sioux signed. In what would 
become typical of colonial strategies, US. gov-
ernment officials ordered the Sioux to choose 
a "head chief," which violated their collabora-
tive, horizontal political structure for decision 
making and was confusing to say the least.5 
Consequently, in the years that followed, the 
Lakota occasionally harassed settlers traveling 
through their land, and in 1855 Gen. William 
S. Harney moved into the area with 600 armed 
soldiers to punish "hostile" Sioux and ordered 
them to convene and to sign a treaty he would 
dictate. The Lakota in turn held a council in 
1856 attended by at least 5,000 and possibly as 
many as 10,000. There they agreed that only 
traders could travel in the area and no roads or 
forts could be constructed; they would defend 
their western territory, and their bands would 
sign no future treaties.6 With the US. Army 
preoccupied with subduing Indian resistance in 
the Southern Plains, an uneasy impasse char-
acterized the Northern Plains. In the 1860s 
impasse changed to full-scale war'? 
THE NORTHERN PLAINS AFTER THE US. 
CIVIL WAR 
By 1865 Euro-Americans commonly viewed 
the Sioux/Lakota as the "enemy" because the 
Dakota Santee Sioux in Minnesota went to 
war against white settlers in 1862. Called the 
Dakota War, it was the largest Indian uprising 
in US. history. In 1865, the Lakota/Dakota 
nation was divided internally between those 
who saw military resistance as the only hope of 
holding onto their land, and those who viewed 
such resistance as futile and counterproduc-
tive, likely to bring more suffering upon people 
already devastated by the retribution taken 
against the Dakota by the US. Army and set-
tlers in the years since the Dakota Uprising. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Army constructed 
forts on the outer edges of the reserved Lakota 
land: Fort Randall in 1856, Fort Abercrombie 
in 1857, Fort Wadsworth in 1864, Fort Buford 
in 1866, a rebuilt Fort Sully farther up river in 
1866, Fort Stevenson in 1867, Fort Ransom in 
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1867, and Fort Totten in 1867, as well as Sidney 
Barracks and Forts D. A. Russell, Sanders, 
and Fred Steele. 8 Lakota like Red Cloud 
objected vociferously to this proliferation of 
military installations in their area. In 1868 
the Lakota and other tribes signed a treaty at 
Fort Laramie in which the federal government, 
acceding to Red Cloud's demand, agreed to 
close three of the forts it had built to guard 
the route along the Bozeman Road to the gold 
fields in Montana. In exchange, the Lakota 
and Northern Cheyenne agreed to stay in an 
area that corresponds to today's South Dakota 
while reserving the right to hunt in Wyoming 
and Montana. Lakota leaders Spotted Tail 
and Red Cloud refused to locate where the 
U.S. military wanted them to settle, along the 
Missouri River, moving their base communities 
the way they traditionally had done. Red Cloud 
remained with the Lakota who had not signed 
the treaty. According to Jerome A. Greene's 
2005 study of Fort Randall, both men in 1870 
went to Washington, DC, t.o negotiate for their 
own separate agencies and were successful, the 
U.S. government establishing the Spotted Tail 
and Red Cloud agencies. But the Lakota lead-
ers continued to face serious problems from the 
U.S. presence in the Great Plains: buffalo rap-
idly disappearing, burial grounds raided by U.S. 
officials who stole skulls for the Army Medical 
Museum, and hundreds of starving Indians 
roaming the area.9 
By 1869 when Ulysses S. Grant became 
president, responsibility for crafting Indian 
policy lay with an uneasy alliance of Christian 
evangelical reformers working with the Indian 
Bureau of the Department of the Interior-
men who considered themselves friends of the 
Indian-and U.S. military men assigned by 
Congress to pacify the Plains. Grant straddled 
a leg on each side of this alliance. In his inau-
gural address that year, Grant included these 
words: "I will favor any course toward them 
[Indians] which tends to their civilization 
and ultimate citizenship."lo Meanwhile, he 
continued to appoint more military men than 
Christian reformers to be Indian agents, despite 
lobbying by activist Christian Indian reform 
organizations to do the opposite. Within a 
year of his inauguration, Congress relieved the 
president of this inconsistent behavior by legis-
lating that military men could not fill civilian 
posts.!l 
Congress shifted Indian policy to civilian 
control and established a special relationship 
between the U.S. government and the nation's 
Christian churches, regardless of constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing the separation of 
church and state. In 1870 Congress authorized 
the churches to appoint up to ten commissioners 
to the Board of Indian Commissioners. These 
commissioners would serve without pay and 
exercise oversight, visiting reservations, ensur-
ing that contracts to provide goods to Indians 
[annuities] were not gouging the Indians, 
and that the distribution of these goods was 
equitable. By 1872, all Indian agencies were 
allocated among the Protestant religious groups 
that served on the Board of Commissioners. For 
at least ten years-while Republicans held the 
White House-these religious groups would 
oversee the Indian agencies that administered 
reservationsl2 (see Fig. 1). 
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FIG. 1. The Structure of u.s. Authority over Native 
Americans. * Rapid turnover was the norm for these 
positions. 
Ohiyesa had been four years old in 1862 when 
the Dakota Uprising in Minnesota brought such 
devastation to the Dakota people, whether they par-
ticipated in the uprising, opposed it and protected 
whites, or tried to remain nonpartisan. Retribution 
was swift and harsh and made no such distinc-
tions: all Dakota were removed from Minnesota, 
their annuities canceled altogether, 303 Dakota 
men were scheduled to be hanged, and hundreds of 
Dakota families fled north to take uncertain refuge 
in Manitoba, Canada. Ohiyesa with his grand-
mother and uncle were among those refugees. 
After more than a decade as a refugee in 
Canada, Ohiyesa's life underwent radical reorga-
nization in 1873. He was fifteen when, returning 
home, he discovered two Indians in white men's 
clothing speaking with his uncle. One of them was 
actually his father, who in 1862 had been "under 
sentence of death" but "against whom no evidence 
was found, and who [was] finally pardoned by 
President Lincoln." His father brought surprising 
news: 
"Your brothers have adopted the white man's 
way; I came for you to learn this new way, 
too; and I want you to grow up a good man." 
He had brought me some civilized clothing. . . 
all myoId ideas were to give place to new ones, 
and my life was to be entirely different from 
that of the past. ... Late in the fall we reached 
the citizen settlement at Flandreau, South 
Dakota, where my father and some others 
dwelt among the whites. 13 
Ohiyesa's name was changed to Charles 
Alexander Eastman. His father, after serving a 
prison sentence for the Dakota War, now called 
himself Jacob Eastman. With a group of Dakota 
Jacob had walked to Flandreau on the Dakota/ 
Minnesota border. They successfully applied to 
be homesteaders. If they could not prevent white 
incursions on their land and the destruction of 
their traditional culture, perhaps they could appro-
priate the most useful ways of the whites who were 
moving west and like the whites receive 160 acres 
free to farm. That is what Jacob Eastman did 
and it seemed to work for his family. His children 
received a formal, "white" education, two of his 
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sons earning advanced degrees. The Dakota com-
munity in Flandreau continues to thrive in 2007. 
Charles's father's choice of assimilating modeled 
what the Christian Indian reformers envisioned as 
the ideal pattern for all Native Americans-adap-
tation to "white" culture, adoption of Christianity, 
adoption of agriculture (ironically, the Dakota 
had been farmers traditionally in Minnesota), 
"white education," and development of what steel 
industrialist Andrew Carnegie in his Gospel of 
Wealth would call "intense individualism." 
TI-IE STRUCTURE OF U.S. COLONIAL 
GOVERNANCE OF NATIVE AMERICANS BY 
1880 
The Christian reformers overseeing the 
Indian agencies in the 1870s and early 1880s 
worried about the caliber of agents on the 
reservations.14 There was much opportunity 
to profit at the Indians' expense if an agent 
did not have integrity. According to Francis 
Prucha, a renowned scholar of Indian policy, 
"Supplying goods to the Indians [was] a 
multimillion-dollar business by the 1870s."15 
Congress passed a law in 1873 promoted 
by reformers establishing five independent 
inspectors who would visit agencies, inspect 
the goods purchased with Indians' annuities, 
and have the power to remove incompetent 
or corrupt agents and appoint their replace-
ments.16 The partnership between the Indian 
Bureau and the churches and religious groups 
was based on the belief that corruption would 
stop if churches nominated agents with genu-
ine commitment to serving Indians, clergy 
or laymen for whom salary was not a major 
motivation. However, low salaries for agents 
contributed to high turnover. In just one 
year, 1878, there were thirty-five new agents 
at the seventy-four agencies. While the U.S. 
government paid the travel expenses of the 
employees on the reservations, it provided no 
subsistence and sometimes no residence. The 
top reservation official, the agent, received a 
salary of $1,500 a year, which was inadequate 
for those bringing their families to live at the 
agency, the Indian commissioners frequently 
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reported to Congress in the 1870s. Also, com-
missioners of Indian affairs, who were the 
chief executives of the Indian Bureau of the 
Department of the Interior, held their jobs 
only briefly; there were ten commissioners in 
the fifteen years following the Civil War. Such 
rapid turnover contributed to multiple shifts in 
policy and lack of clarity for both officials and 
the indigenous people they tried to control. 
ASSIMILATION 
Assimilation was a major goal of Indian 
policy, with multiple strategies for achiev-
ing it. One strategy urged by the military 
and authorized by Congress in 1878 was the 
establishment of a reservation police force of 
Indians that would model assimilation: Indian 
police dressed "white," practiced monogamy, 
received guns and horses, oversaw distribu-
tion of rations and construction of roads and 
irrigation ditches, took the reservation census, 
and arrested Indians accused of minor crimes 
like drunkenness, wife beating, and theft. In 
short, Indian police who would implement 
U.S. Indian policy on the reservations had a 
special elite status that reservation Indians 
would want to emulate, proponents believed. 
Agencies were quick to add Indian police. Two 
years after Congress authorized Indian police, 
forty agencies had them, and by 1890, fifty-
nine. 
Another strategy to promote assimilation 
was to establish Indian courts beginning 
in 1883. These courts had jurisdiction over 
those aspects of traditional Indian culture 
most abhorred by the reformers, the military, 
and the settlers alike-dances, polygamy, 
and medicine men who tried to interfere 
with the government's civilization program. 
Indian courts also heard cases of destruction 
of property, theft, liquor traffic, intoxication, 
and misdemeanors, but this experiment in self-
government was limited by the regulation that 
"the Agent had to approve all court decrees 
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs as the 
ultimate arbiter in case of disputes."!7 Before 
these Courts of Indian Offenses existed the 
agent served as prosecutor and judge, with the 
authority to charge, prosecute, and sentence 
Indians on the reservation under his control. 
The new courts brought a kind of indirect 
rule, the federal government (Bureau of Indian 
Affairs) governing through Indian tribal police 
and Indian judges who retained their jobs as 
long as their allegiance was to the white agent 
rather than their tribe.18 The system was strik-
ingly similar to the British colonial system 
of administration, indirect rule, which gave 
some limited local autonomy to indigenous 
governing bodies but preserved ultimate power 
to undermine their decisions to the colonial 
government. 
EDUCATION, ONE ROAD TO ASSIMILATION 
Education was critical if Indians were to 
assimilate-to become self-supporting, to 
embrace intense individualism, and to give up 
their traditional tribal cultures. Yet thirteen 
years after the Civil War there were only 2,589 
spaces in boarding schools for Indian children 
and 33,000 Indian children to be educated. 
There were reservation day schools, but policy 
makers preferred boarding schools because they 
removed children from their families, language, 
and culture and were viewed as more effective 
in "'de-tribalizing" children and teaching them 
the acquisitiveness that characterized capitalist 
America in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century.19 
Charles Eastman wrote about his experience 
with schools for Indian children even though his 
family's multiethnic homesteading community 
at Flandreau was not a reservation. At fifteen, 
Eastman moved from Canada to Flandreau, 
South Dakota, to join his father, who sent him 
to the local school to learn English. The other 
children taught him about assimilation in his first 
conversation with them: 
Charles: "Yes, this is my own pony. My uncle 
in Canada always used him to chase the buffalo 
and he has ridden him in many battles." I spoke 
with considerable pride. 
[Another boy]: "Well, as there are no more 
buffalo to chase now, your pony will have to 
pull the plow like the rest." 
Charles wrote: 
I was considerably interested in the strange 
appearance of these school children. They all 
had on some apology for white man's cloth-
ing. . . . The hair of all the boys was cut short, 
and, in spite of the evidences of great effort 
to keep it down, it stood erect like porcupine 
quills. . .. [I]f I had to look like these boys in 
order to obtain something of the white man's 
learning, it was time for me to rebel. ... I had 
seen nothing thus far to prove to me the good 
of civilization . ... I must tell my father that I 
cannot stay here.2o 
In 1874, at age sixteen, Charles Eastman left 
Flandreau to go to a mission school for Dakota 
children at the Dakota Agency in Nebraska, run 
by a missionary friend of his father, Dr. Alfred L. 
Riggs. He walked 150 miles to attend the school, 
where his older brother was an assistant teacher. 
The school was a vocational school similar to 
Hampton Institute in Virginia, which had been set 
up for African Americans after the Civil War and 
included some Native American children by 1869. 
Hampton's most famous graduate was Booker T. 
Washington, who would become the best-known 
black man from 1895 until his early death in 1915. 
Charles Eastman/Ohiyesa would have the same 
celebrity as Washington during his much longer 
lifetime. 
The Santee mission school in Nebraska was 
run much like Hampton. Students were provided 
with oxen and farming tools, books in Dakota and 
English, a suit of American clothes, a white man's 
bed, and a haircut. Charles noted the despair of 
Indian children brought to the school and sepa-
rated from their parents. He noted the exhaus-
tion-perhaps it was depression-he felt from 
the "weary repetition" of boarding-school life. But 
with encouraging letters from his father he mas-
tered English, and then, as he was about to leave 
for Wisconsin to attend Beloit College, he learned 
of his father's sudden death. In traditional Dakota 
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culture he would have taken a year to mourn, but 
there was no time for protracted mourning in the 
new culture he was acquiring. He took the train to 
Wisconsin rather than returning to Flandreau for 
the funeraPl 
With support from Presbyterian missionaries 
among the Dakota, both Charles and his brother 
John received scholarships to attend "white" col-
leges "back East." Charles spent three years at 
Beloit College (1876-1879), then attended Knox 
College, then Kimball Union and Dartmouth 
(1883-1887), and finally Boston University 
Medical School (1887-1890). 
MILITARY PACIFICATION 
If the first leg of Indian policy during the 
post-Civil War era was "reservate," "civilize," 
and educate, the second leg was military pacifi-
cation of the Plains. The so-called Peace Policy 
adopted by President Grant and continued by 
President Rutherford B. Hayes included a com-
mitment to "exterminate" Indians who resisted 
being removed again and again to smaller and 
smaller reservations, those termed "hostiles." 
The Great Plains erupted several times during 
these decades in warfare between whites and 
Indians and between Indians and Indians. 
The treatment of Indian civilians by the 
U.S. Army frequently fanned anger among 
Indians and among white reformers as in the 
1864 Sand Creek Massacre of 250 or so peace-
able Cheyenne under Black Kettle in Colorado; 
the 1867 attack on a Cheyenne village by Gen. 
Wil~iam Scott Hancock; and Gen. Oliver 
Howard's defeat of Chief Joseph of the Nez 
Perce in 1877. Conversely, Indian treatment 
of white soldiers and civilians fed anti-Indian 
sentiment, for example, Crazy Horse's killing 
of eighty-one U.S. soldiers in December 1866 
(the Fetterman Massacre) and the Modoc of 
California killing two U.S. peace commission-
ers in 1873. The Lakota defeat and killing of 
Custer's regiment in 1876 was widely covered 
in the media and eroded white easterners' sym-
pathy for Indians. 
By 1876 the U.S. Army had 15,412 soldiers 
in the Great Plains. 22 Official policy from 
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FIG. 2. Map of the Great Sioux Reservation and surrounding areas (1868-89). Courtesy of the Smithsonian 
Institution, National Anthropological Archives, Wintercounts website: http://wintercountes.si.edu/htmL 
version/pdfs/map.cmyk.pdf. Map adapted from the Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 13: Plains, Pt. 
1 and Pt. 2, p. 794, edited by Raymond]. DeMallie, general editor, William C. Sturtevant, published by the 
Smithsonian Institution, 2001. 
the White House under Grant and his suc-
cessor, President Hayes, was that white set-
tlers should be removed from Indian land. 
However, in an area the size of continental 
Europe, 15,412 soldiers probably could not 
have effectively enforced these orders. With 
their officers ambivalent at best about remov-
ing white settlers, these presidential directives 
had little impact.23 Gen. Philip Sheridan, who 
had jurisdiction over the area from Canada 
to Mexico and from the Mississippi River 
through the Rockies, commanded two-thirds 
of the army, and was in charge of the Indian 
wars theatre. Sheridan believed that Indians 
had to be "broken" before they could be "civi-
lized."24 According to historian Henry E. Fritz, 
while many military men were sympathetic 
ro using reservations to achieve assimilation 
and education, few in the military liked being 
under civilian Indian agents. They worked to 
get the Indian Bureau transferred to the War 
Department, perhaps because they worried 
about losing employment once pacification 
was completed. However, they were unable to 
persuade Congress to make this change. 
us. soldiers in the Plains also faced pres-
sure from settlers in the West who wanted more 
forts ro be built and more federal troops pres-
ent. Settlers lobbied Congress, sometimes using 
their state legislatures to communicate their 
views; for example, Kansas demanded all res-
ervations be removed from the state. Frederick 
E. Hoxie notes that these western whites would 
become increasingly important in formulating 
Indian policy as new western states entered the 
union.25 Francis Prucha observed in The Great 
Father: 
[Tlhe army used surprise attacks on Indian 
villages, and sometimes it resorted to cam-
paigns during the winter, when the Indians 
were accustomed to curtail their operations 
and were often ill-prepared to beat back an 
attacker. Such tactics were "total war," for 
the women and children were nearly always 
intermingled with the fighting men.26 
President Grant sent a humanitarian com-
mission to inform the Lakota that they must 
relinquish the Black Hills and some other 
land or the government would simply seize it. 
The Black Hills were sacred to the Lakota, but 
gold had been discovered in 1873, a time of 
national economic depression in the United 
States. Gold pulled economically depressed 
whites to the Black Hills, despite their being 
off limits by treaty, and Grant was unwilling 
to support the Lakota's prior treaty rights 
against the pressure of these Euro-American 
migrants. Technically, the Fort Laramie 
Treaty required 75 percent of adult males to 
agree to any future changes to the treaty. 
Only one in ten Lakota signed the agree-
ment to relinquish this land, far short of the 
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requirement. President Grant needed a new 
strategy.27 
According to Jeffrey Ostler's 2004 study, 
The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from 
Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee, because the 
US. Army had successfully waged war in the 
Southern Plains from 1869 to 1873-against the 
Apaches, Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, 
and Kiowas, subduing their resistance to 
moving onto reservations and becoming 
dependents of the US. government-the army 
could shift more of its forces north by 1874. 
The availability of troops enabled the adoption 
of a new strategy to gain control of that Black 
Hills area that the Lakota had refused to sell. 
President Grant ordered the army to pull out 
of the Black Hills and no longer protect Indian 
land there from miners seeking to flock to the 
region. Knowing miners would surge into the 
Black Hills and that the Lakota would fight 
to keep them out, Grant planned to use the 
expected Indian attacks on settlers and miners 
as a pretext for US. military action against the 
Northern Plains tribes and to demand that the 
Black Hills be exchanged with the US. gov-
ernment for whatever payment the government 
offered. Lakota bands who resisted and refused 
to come to the agencies, the federal govern-
ment centers for administering Indian policy 
on reservations, would be considered hostile 
and hunted down. Meanwhile, confined to 
reservations with their food supply dependent 
on US. supplies of rations, those Lakota and 
their allies who were not at war with the US. 
Army ~ould be "persuaded" to sign away the 
Black Hills in order to get food. The United 
States would use food as a weapon.2S 
In December 1875, the army announced 
that "all Sioux who were not at the agencies 
by January 31, 1876, would be hunted down 
by the army and brought in by military force." 
Those Lakota who refused to accept alteration 
of their treaty and loss of the Black Hills held 
out for more than a year of fighting, killing 
twice as many enemy combatants as were killed 
by the US. Army in what came to be known 
as the Great Sioux War.29 The United States 
had given them one month in the middle of a 
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Northern Plains winter in an area the size of 
Europe to get the word that they must move 
onto reservations or be targeted for extermina-
tion. Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Red Cloud, and 
others opted to resist, and the Great Sioux War 
began in early 1876. 
When three columns of US. troops moved 
onto Sioux land, the surprised Lakota killed 
all the soldiers in the column led by Gen. 
George Armstrong Custer, at Little Big Horn, 
Montana, on June 25. This Lakota victory 
intensified the US. Army's military campaign. 
First Spotted Tail and then Red Cloud came 
in to the agencies to make peace while Sitting 
Bull and Crazy Horse went north, joining the 
Dakota refugees in Manitoba for a time. 
By September, the army had taken control 
of the western Lakota agencies and "was in a 
strong position to extract retribution."30 Many 
Lakota who lived on the reservations were 
ready to sign an agreement giving up the Black 
Hills and their hunting grounds in Wyoming 
and Montana in order to receive rations to 
keep their people alive through the winter. 
Gen. George Crook and Col. Nelson Miles 
each led army units in the Great Sioux War. 
Crook implemented a policy of divide and rule 
to keep those on reservations from aiding those 
militarily resisting. He chose Spotted Tail to be 
the person with whom the US. Army would 
work most closely and punished Red Cloud 
because his sympathies were suspected to be 
with the "militants" in the north. The army 
made Spotted Tail "head chief of the Lakota," 
a position that did not exist among the 
horizontally structured Lakota, who governed 
themselves through councils of elders. General 
Crook enlisted a total of 355 Indian scouts, 
including 155 Sioux, to join him in fighting 
Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and the others who 
resisted US. invasion of their land in violation 
of earlier treaties. Fighting through the winter 
months of 1876-77, the 4,000 Indian refugees 
attached to the resistors suffered terribly; 
elders' stories are still told about this time.31 
By January 1877 many had given up and 
gone onto the reservations. By May, the US. 
forces suffered 283 dead and claimed 150 
Indian deaths. Spotted Tail, Crazy Horse's 
uncle, agreed to negotiate with Crazy Horse 
and the others if he could offer them favorable 
terms; he refused to go if all he could offer 
was unconditional surrender. Authorized by 
General Crook to offer them a new agency in 
the north, Spotted Tail and Red Cloud went 
to Crazy Horse's camp, and he agreed to sur-
render. With 700 Lakota women and children, 
200 mounted warriors, and 2,000 horses, Crazy 
Horse surrendered May 7, 1877, offering the 
peace pipe to Crook's subordinate, a very seri-
ous commitment to peace in Lakota/Dakota 
culture. In the end, the United States took 
the Black Hills, reducing the Great Sioux 
Reservation significantly. Four months later 
Crazy Horse was murdered. 
General Crook never requested a northern 
reservation for Crazy Horse as he had promised 
to do, and Crook sent Crazy Horse's Northern 
Cheyenne allies to Indian Territory (OklahQma 
today) despite their having been told they would 
get their own northern reservation. Crook also 
canceled a buffalo hunt he had authorized to be 
held in August 1877. Mistranslation persuaded 
Crook's subordinate that Crazy Horse intended 
to "fight until not a white man is left," and 
resulted in the decision to arrest him with the 
help of Lakota band leaders and 400 Indians. 
The likelihood was that Crazy Horse would be 
confined in Florida in the Fort Marion prison. 
When Crazy Horse realized what was happen-
ing, he struggled against those escorting him 
and was stabbed by his old friend, Indian scout 
Little Big Man. According to Ostler, the key 
factor that aborted the peace Crazy Horse had 
made with Crook was Crook's reneging on his 
promise to secure a northern agency for Crazy 
Horse.32 
During the fall of 1876, a few months after 
Little Big Horn, Charles Eastman lived in Beloit, 
Wisconsin, where the local newspaper printed a 
story that he was the nephew of Sitting Bull, who 
led Lakota warriors against the U.S. Army. In 
fact, two of Charles's uncles had participated in 
the killing of Custer's regiment. Local white chil-
dren, who Charles called "savages," taunted him 
when he ventured out. "People were bitter against 
the Sioux in those days . ... I was now a stranger 
in a strange country, and deep in a strange life 
from which I could not retreat." When he looked 
for summer employment, a farmer he approached 
for work ordered: "Get off from my farm just as 
quick as you can! I had a cousin killed by your 
people only last summer." At the same time, his 
proficiency in English had improved dramatically 
to the point where 
for the first time [I] permitted myself to think 
and act as a white man . ... This was my ambi-
tion-that the Sioux should accept civilization 
before it was too late! I wished that our young 
men might at once take up the white man's 
way, and prepare themselves to hold office and 
wield influence in their native states. 33 
LAKOTA/DAKOTA RESISTANCE 
The resistance of Great Plains Indians to 
US. colonization took many forms. Some chose 
to wage warfare against invaders of their land, 
and when their people's suffering required relief, 
to relocate voluntarily to Canada and to the 
more remote areas of the western Plains. Crazy 
Horse, Red Cloud, Sitting Bull, and many others 
chose this path in the decade from 1867 to 
1877. Others chose deliberately to assimilate, to 
acquire the tools of the colonizer and use them 
to make life better for their family and people. 
The fathers of Charles Eastman/Ohiyesa and 
Luther Standing Bear/Ota Nte followed this 
route and understood it to require warrior-
like courage. Some preserved their traditional 
culture at all costs, retaining dress, language, 
customs, and stories despite the derision they 
often experienced from Euro-Americans and 
Indians who chose to assimilate. Resistance also 
was manifested in working within the reserva-
tion structure to expose its violence against 
native people through advocacy to government 
officials in Washington, DC. 
During the late 1870s delegations of Lakota 
leaders from each of the agencies traveled 
repeatedly to Washington to negotiate with the 
president and his officials. In September 1877 
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a delegation including Red Cloud and Spotted 
Tail, leaders of Oglala and Brule agencies, 
respectively, on the Great Sioux Reservation, 
told President Hayes and newspaper journal-
ists that they desired citizenship and did not 
want to be removed again. Spotted Tail told 
the president, "You take our lands from us 
... your people make roads and drive away 
the game, and thus make us poor and starve 
us."34 To move 9,000 Lakota to a new site on 
the Missouri River as winter was approach-
ing-what Hayes proposed for them-would 
be devastating; removal to Indian Territory 
(Oklahoma today)-advocated by some of 
Hayes's military advisors-was totally unac-
ceptable. They must be allowed to select their 
own sites if their agencies had to be moved. 
President Hayes agreed to allow them to select 
permanent sites for their agencies wherever they 
chose on the Great Sioux Reservation if they 
would agree to go to the Missouri River for the 
winter of 1877-78, since the government had 
already expended money taking their rations and 
annuity supplies to this location. They agreed. 
Walking hundreds of miles to a temporary 
location under US. military escort with tem-
peratures well below freezing and with insuffi-
cient provisions produced resistance among the 
Brules and Oglalas. By the end of November 
both groups had halted about sixty miles short 
of their assigned destination, and some had left 
for Canada to join Sitting Bull, the Hunkpapa 
Lakota leader who had received guarantees 
from the Canadian government that it would 
not allow the US. Army to pursue his band on 
Canadian soil. In mid-February word arrived 
that 'President Hayes had reversed course 
and would not allow them to select their own 
agency locations. Both groups had already 
done so. By the following fall, 1878, they 
decided to "force the issue" by removing to the 
sites they had selected, sending the president a 
message through their Indian agent that they 
"do not do this to defy or hurt the feelings of 
the Great Father, but because it is their duty 
to do the best they can to protect their women 
and children."35 Although military leaders 
like General Sherman were outraged at this 
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FIG. 3. Charles Eastman, class photo at Dart-
mouth College, c. 1887. Courtesy of The Essential 
Charles Eastman (Ohiyesa), edited by Michael Oren 
Fitzgerald (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2007). 
insubordination, the executive branch chose 
to go along with the Brules and Oglalas in 
this instance. In early 1879 the Oglalas began 
building permanent structures at their new 
Pine Ridge Agency under Red Cloud and the 
Brules at their new Rosebud Agency under 
Spotted Taip6 They had demonstrated skill 
exercising diplomacy, tenacity, and nonviolent 
resistance and had prevailed in selecting their 
own sites for government Indian agencies. The 
u.S. government, however, had not abandoned 
its plans to further truncate the Great Sioux 
Reservation. 
As an adult Ohiyesa/Charles Eastman 
interviewed Lakota, Nez Perce, Ojibway, and 
Cheyenne leaders from this time and wrote 
about them in his 1918 book, Indian Heroes and 
Great Chieftains.37 Eastman wrote that US. 
Indian policy caused division within each tribe 
between those who believed in resistance to the 
US. Army's forced removal policy and those who 
believed in accommodation, convinced that resis-
tance would only result in extermination. These 
two disparate responses to US. policy fractured 
the traditional governance structure of tribes. 
Traditionally, councils of leaders would establish 
policy by consensus. Instead, in the 1860s through 
1890s individual chiefs would lead their bands in 
separate directions, although ultimately, virtually 
every chief who survived would be forced by the 
superiority of us. military technology and by 
starvation conditions on reservations to give up 
resistance. Eastman wrote about Lakota leader 
Red Cloud of the Oglalas who refused to sign the 
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 until the US. Army 
met his conditions: Red Cloud insisted that the 
army dismantle forts it had built on Lakota land 
and abandon a new road it was building across 
Indian land into the Black Hills-the Powder 
River Road or Bozeman Trail. The forts and 
the road were in violation of earlier treaties and 
therefore illegal. Red Cloud told Eastman that he 
signed only when the treaty 
distinctly stated that the Black Hills and the Big 
Horn were Indian country, set apart for their 
perpetual occupancy, and that no white man 
should enter that region without the consent 
of the Sioux. Scarcely was this treaty signed, 
however, when gold was discovered in the 
Black Hills, and the popular cry was : "Remove 
the Indians!" 
Betrayed by the commissioners, Red Cloud fought 
the US. Army for eight years, from 1868 to 
1876, rather than be forced upon a reservation or 
removed to Indian Territory. In the end he was 
captured, imprisoned, and removed to Pine Ridge 
Agency, where he lived until his death in 1909, 
giving up any hope for successful resistance against 
the technology of the Euro-Americans. 38 
On the reservation Red Cloud experienced 
the U.S. government elevating Spotted Tail to 
"head chief" because he had been the earliest 
Lakota leader to agree to live on a reservation. 
This undermining of Lakota/Dakota polity, 
which recognized the political power of coun-
cils of leaders and was not hierarchical, was 
standard operating procedure for U.S. Indian 
policy. The agent in charge of the reservation 
threatened Red Cloud with arrest and repeat-
edly undermined his authority, especially 
after Red Cloud charged a resident white 
trader with larceny, notified Washington 
of shortfalls in rations, and petitioned for 
citizenship for his people. The agent set up his 
own agency council that excluded Red Cloud, 
another violation of the horizontal decision-
making structure of the Lakota, according to 
Ostler.39 
POPULAR CULTURE AND REFORMERS 
By the 1880s Red Cloud's interest in citizen-
ship for Indians was mirrored in the "scientific" 
scholarly community. Historian Frederick 
E. Hoxie, in Final Promise: The Campaign to 
Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920, identified 
the optimism about Native Americans that 
prevailed in the 1880s and 1890s as the new 
academic discipline of anthropology prompted 
study of native peoples around the globe 
and theoretical constructs for understanding 
"civilization." The Smithsonian Institution 
established a Bureau of Ethnology in 1879, led 
by founding director Maj. John Wesley Powell 
(1834-1902). Powell believed, as did his mentor 
Henry Morgan, that there were stages any 
group had to pass through to achieve "civiliza-
tion": savagery (foraging), barbarism (farming 
land in common), civilization (individualized 
farming), and enlightenment (industrializa-
tion). While a professor at Illinois Normal 
University, Powell had testified to the U.S. 
House Indian Affairs Committee in 1874: "The 
sooner this country is entered by white people 
and the game destroyed so that the Indians 
will be compelled to gain a subsistence by some 
other means than hunting, the better it will 
be for them." He advocated individual land 
tenure, citizenship, and total assimilation as 
the best way to help Native Americans move 
along his trajectory to "civilization."40 
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In the 1880s, supported by the encourage-
ment of the "scientific" conclusions of anthro-
pologists, the interests of railroads, the 
military, and white settlers converged in sup-
port of a policy of assimilation, integration, 
and individualization of Indian landholdings. 
Hoxie concludes that the assimilation/inte-
gration policy was rooted in the optimistic 
(and perhaps naive) belief that indigenous 
peoples would pass through the "stages of 
development" and attain "civilization" if the 
policies toward them nurtured and reinforced 
this development. Clearly it was also rooted 
in the self-interests of each group involved. 
Railroads in their competition for transcon-
tinental routes sought to lay track across 
reservation land and also to entice settlers to 
locate towns along their routes; it was well 
known in railroad circles that local trade was 
what kept railroads solvent. The military was 
generally weary of Indian wars that seemed 
virtually over by 1880. Whites moving west 
with the railroads wanted to settle land they 
viewed as "unused," reservation land, and land 
free of "hostiles." 
In 1880 Native Americans controlled a land 
mass one and a half times the size of California, 
managing that land with their own political 
and legal systems and maintaining economic 
self-sufficiency. But the rapidly growing white 
population in the west was eclipsing the native 
population in numbers. In Dakota Territory in 
1870 Indians had outnumbered whites by two 
to one; ten years later, in 1880, whites outnum-
bered Indians six to one.41 
The overwhelmingly white Indian reform 
movement also tended to support replacing 
reservations, which separated native people 
from the majority population, with assimila-
tion, citizenship, integrated education, and 
individual land allotments. The 1880s saw the 
birth of dynamic advocacy groups address-
ing the need to reform Indian policy. Several 
reform groups formed in 1879 after the press 
reported stories of native groups walking north 
from their assigned new location in Indian 
Territory to their ancestral lands and being 
confined in western forts and denied food 
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when they refused to return to their assigned 
reservation. Ponca leader Standing Bear and 
Omaha Suzette LaFlesche and her brother 
Joseph LaFlesche toured eastern cities that fall, 
telling large audiences how terrible conditions 
were on reservations and calling for Indians 
to receive citizenship and for reservations to 
be disbanded. The Boston Indian Citizenship 
Committee, the Women's National Indian 
Association, and, by 1882, the Indian Rights 
Association all formed in response, their goal 
being to reform Indian policy.42 
Annually from 1883 to 1919 Indian reformers 
met at a New York resort on Lake Mohonk to 
spend three days discussing Indian policy. The 
Lake Mohonk annual conferences brought an 
informal coalition of Indian reformers together 
with members of the government-appointed 
voluntary Board of Indian Commissioners. By 
the mid-1880s the reformers at Lake Mohonk 
advocated allotment of 160 acres for each head 
of household on each reservation. They rec-
ommended extending civil service reform to 
reservation employment and extending state, 
territorial, and local laws to cover Indians just 
like the rest of US. residents.43 They also advo-
cated establishing a system of Indian schools to 
teach the ways of the white middle class. 
Congress had funded Indian education 
since 1811 by giving money to religious orga-
nizations that set up schools as part of their 
mission work; virtually no schools for Indians 
were government owned. But that changed in 
1879. From 1879 to 1894 government funding 
for Indian schools grew from $75,000 a year 
to more than $2 million, and twenty govern-
ment-operated off-reservation boarding schools 
were established along with dozens of agency 
schools. A superintendent of Indian education 
was appointed to oversee this new educational 
bureaucracy in 1882.44 Over the decade of the 
1880s a centralized Indian education program 
would require children to attend school, provide 
them common textbooks keyed to set grade 
levels, and place teachers and administrators 
under civil service regulations-the goal being 
both to professionalize Indian education and to 
reduce tribal influence on Indian children.45 
PARTISAN POLITICS AND INDIAN POLICY 
In 1871, three years into the Fort Laramie 
Treaty, a member of the US. House of Repre-
sentatives added a rider to an appropriations 
bill that said there would be no further treaty-
making with Native American nations. He was 
responding to some disgruntled members of the 
House jealous that the Senate alone had the 
power to make agreements related to so much 
western land. Some in Congress anticipated 
that the House and Senate would expand con-
siderably with formation of new western states. 
Senate approval of the bill with its rider ush-
ered in a major change in Indian policy-trea-
ties made by the executive branch and ratified 
by the Senate were replaced by "agreements" 
approved by both houses of Congress. Congress 
was now an equal player with the executive 
branch in Indian policy making. Although the 
terms of treaties negotiated and ratified before 
1872 remained in effect, these treaties were 
routinely violated by subsequent "agreements" 
that further reduced Indian land and by agents 
who looked the other way as whites settlers 
surged west onto Indian land. However, the 
little-noticed change that Congress adopted 
in 1871, to go into effect in 1872, would have a 
profound impact on Indians by canceling their 
status as independent nations and emphasizing 
that they were "wards" of the U.S. govern-
ment.46 Henceforth both houses of Congress 
would legislate Indian policy, tying Indian 
policy to the partisan politics of the US. two-
party system. 
No longer would Native Americans be con-
sidered foreign nationals. But what were they? 
The Fourteenth Amendment added to the 
Constitution in 1868 had made all people born 
in the US. citizens except Indians. What legal 
rights did Native Americans have as tribal 
entities or as individuals? What power did 
treaties have that were already ratified by the 
US. Senate? The answers to these questions 
would unfold over the next several decades in 
bills passed by Congress and in Supreme Court 
decisions and would amount to a steady erosion 
of the legal rights of Native Americans. 
When the Democrats retook the presidency 
in 1885-1889 and again in 1893-97, with Grover 
Cleveland in the White House both times, 
the former system of rewarding political con-
tributors with federal appointments, including 
appointments to be Indian agents, returned. 
A young Anglo woman teaching among the 
Sioux, Elaine Goodale, visited Indian agencies in 
1885 and complained that the U.S. government 
service was filled with Democrats who had no love 
for the red man. "[T]heir attitudes sometimes sug-
gested the kind of smiling tolerance one displays 
toward a pair of precocious-and occasionally 
troublesome-children," she wrote. Corruption 
continued in the contracts for providing annuities, 
she noted. She witnessed thirteen distributions of 
annuities-typically a blanket for each man, a 
quilt for each woman, and some cloth for dresses. 
Elaine Goodale wrote that "these goods were 
nearly worthless and a burden to the recipients, 
who often threw them away or sold them for what-
ever they could get." High turnover among those 
responsible for Indian agencies and politicization 
of appointments meant that policy was continu-
ally modified, ineffectively policed, and reforms 
barely implemented before they were altered or 
abandoned.47 
RETHINKING AND REDUCING 
RESERVATIONS 
The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 reserved 
nearly 60 million acres of the Dakota Territory 
for the Lakota/Dakota people .48 However, 
beginning in 1871 the interests of the railroads 
and the westward-moving public converged 
and secured from the Republican majority in 
Congress erosion of that treaty's guarantees 
and of treaty rights across the board. Gradually, 
incrementally, probably barely noted by most 
members of the u.s. Congress, federal legisla-
tors through minor legislative actions dramati-
cally altered U.S. Indian policy.49 
Under the Fort Laramie Treaty the u.s. gov-
ernment promised to keep railroads and settlers 
out of Indian land. Railroads, the major new 
industry that was driving the u.s. economy in 
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FIG. 4. Elaine Goodale Eastman, c. 1893. Courtesy 
of The Essential Charles Eastman (Ohiyesa), edited 
by Michael Oren Fitzgerald (Bloomington, IN: 
World Wisdom, 2007) . 
the post-Civil War era, were in fierce competi-
tion for a northern transcontinental route. They 
argued that it was essential that the railroads 
be allowed to go directly through Lakota land 
to link most efficiently industries and consum-
ers on both coasts. Settlers must be allowed to 
follow the rails and settle along rail routes. Then 
the 'Black Hills were taken in 1876-77 under 
President Grant's strategy as discussed above. 
But the call for more land to be "liberated" 
from the Lakota and other Plains Indians 
increased in volume in the 1880s. By 1883 
General Sherman reported, "I now regard the 
Indians as substantially eliminated ... . There 
may be spasmodic and temporary alarms, but 
such Indian wars as have hitherto disturbed 
the public peace and tranquility are not prob-
able."so In other words, settler expansion onto 
more Indian land did not carry the risks it had 
carried a decade earlier. 
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The rationale of western settlers and con-
gressmen was that the Indians were not using 
their land. Homesteaders held 160 acres, but 
Indians corporately held the equivalent of 
1,000 acres apiece. Because they were not farm-
ing or ranching the land, the Indians should 
lose their rights to it under "natural law." 
Again, federally appointed commissions were 
sent to negotiate agreements reducing Lakota 
land, beginning in 1882 and continuing for 
seven years. 51 
During the decade of the 1880s Congress 
considered three bills that would respond to 
the growing consensus that reservations were 
not working. Each bill called for dividing res-
ervation land into individual 160-acre plots 
assigned to native families, the surplus land 
to be sold and the proceeds going to supply 
the tribe with farming equipment and school 
supplies. The first bill, the Coke bill of 1881, 
gave tribes the right to decide what land would 
be allotted and whether to retain some com-
monly owned land. It also would have made 
those accepting allotments' US. citizens.52 The 
second attempt to pass allotment came in 1884 
and passed the Senate but not the House. That 
was the year that the US. Supreme Court ruled 
in Elk v. Wilkins that Indians could not vote 
and were not citizens under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court argued that Elk, and 
by extrapolation Indians generally, was born 
on land that was not (yet) the United States, 
and Congress had not established a process for 
naturalizing Indians.53 This decision muddied 
the issue of citizenship. The third attempt to 
pass an allotment bill, the Dawes Act, passed 
Congress in 1887, stating that citizenship would 
accompany the acceptance of allotments, but 
without specifying any timetable or procedure 
for how those who accepted allotments would 
become voting citizens. Each proposed bill fur-
ther limited the rights Congress was willing to 
extend to native peoples. 
Under the Dawes Act, the president had 
authority to determine when a tribe's land 
could be allotted. Land allotted could not be 
sold or taxed for twenty-five years, a transitional 
period to gradually ease Native Americans into 
the economics of assimilation.54 By 1887 US. 
policy supported allotment of reservation land; 
each head of household who would renounce 
his tribal, collective right to reservation land, 
would receive individual plots. The leftover land 
would become public domain of the US. gov-
ernment and be offered as homestead plots to 
settlers. This policy shift removed from Native 
Americans millions more acres and added them 
to the US. treasury. According to Indian policy 
historian Henry E. Fritz, the allotment policy 
enunciated in the Dawes Act "virtually con-
demned reservation Indians to poverty for many 
generations."55 The intent, however, was more 
benign, as argued by reformers and the chair of 
the Indian Affairs Committee of the House. As 
historian Hoxie explains, Republican senator 
Henry Dawes from Massachusetts "believed 
that reductions in the size of reservations would 
bring the two races closer together and allow 
American institutions-its schools, its political 
system, and its expanding economy-to 'raise 
up' the Indian."56 Allotment became so popular 
with Friends of the Indian that while Thomas 
Jefferson Morgan was the commissioner of 
Indian affairs, he required that February 8, 1887, 
the day the Dawes Act was signed into law, be 
celebrated by all Indian schools as a holiday. 57 
Even before allotment got underway, the 
US. government during the decade of the 
1880s removed millions of acres of land 
from Native Americans through a series of 
land cessions that disregarded treaties, and 
reduced the size of the reservations of the 
Lakota (Sioux), Crow, Blackfoot, Omaha, and 
others.58 According to Hoxie, there were seven 
major cessions of Indian land during the 1880s: 
the Ute in Colorado in 1880, the Columbia and 
Colville Reservation in Washington State in 
1884 and 1892, Indian Territory in 1889, the 
Great Sioux Reservation in 1889, the Blackfoot 
and Crow in Montana in 1889, and the 
Bannock-Shoshone in Idaho in 1889.59 Again, 
the coalition of railroads, Christian reformers, 
and the western settlers supported this policy. 
What happened with the Lakota/Sioux is 
illustrative of how land cessions worked else-
where on the Plains. In late 1882 the Dakota 
territorial government sent a commission to 
the Sioux agencies to secure the marks of male 
heads of households on a paper authorizing 
division of the Great Sioux Reservation into 
separate, smaller reservations, but the idea 
and the paper were abandoned in the face of 
opposition from the Lakota and the Indian 
Reform Association lobby. Six years later the 
national government sought to persuade the 
Sioux/Lakota to sign away another 11 million 
acres of their land and divide the Great Sioux 
Reservation into seven smaller reservations. 
Earlier treaties required that three-fourths of 
Lakota males agree to alterations in treaties. 
The commission sent to the Lakota to secure 
their agreement was asking them to accept 
provisions it had already enacted into law. 
Capt. Richard Pratt was dispatched to meet 
with Sioux leaders at Standing Rock agency, 
arriving on July 21, 1888, to get their signa-
tures on this "agreement." He told them that 
they must either accept the agreement or their 
future would be "problematical and uncertain." 
Historian Ostler writes that 600 Indians were 
present from western agencies. Pratt and the 
other commissioners talked for seven hours; 
the Indians spoke for one hour and concluded, 
"We will not sign those papers." It was summer, 
they said, and they needed to return to their 
fields since, unlike the commissioners, they 
were not receiving a salary.6o To determine 
their response to Pratt, the Lakota had met in 
a council from which U.S. government repre-
sentatives were excluded. 
Lakota-speaking Elaine Goodale was included 
in this meeting because "I was on their side," she 
wrote. Her presence angered negotiator Pratt, who 
called her to his office the next day and asked 
what right had I to attend a secret council 
to which no member of the commission had 
access? I replied that I was there as a represen-
tative of the press. The Sioux leaders, in giving 
me permission, had indicated their confidence 
that I would report them fairly to the American 
public. Capt Pratt then demanded whether I 
had encouraged them to reject the government's 
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offer, adding severely that so long was I was 
on the payroll I was bound to support what-
ever policy Washington chose to adopt. I said, 
quite frankly, that I had taken no active part 
in the discussions but . . . was not convinced 
that they could not do better through further 
negotiations. I added (not a little nettled): "I 
am here solely in what I believe to be the best 
interests of the Sioux and the fact of holding a 
government position would never stand in the 
way of expressing my honest opinions. Ifneces-
sary, I could always resign! "61 
Pratt's mission failed. The Sioux united in 
refusing this proposal. 62 
The following year, 1889, Congress admit-
ted North and South Dakota as states and 
dispatched General Crook to get the Sioux 
approval that Pratt had failed to secure. 
Congress passed a new act raising the price 
Indians would receive for their land from fifty 
cents an acre to $1.25 an acre. Whatever had 
not sold in ten years the U.S. government 
would buy for fifty cents an acre. Allotments 
would be increased to 320 acres from 160, and 
those taking allotments would receive fifty dol-
lars as well, up from the twenty dollars offered 
by the Pratt Commission. Led by General 
Crook, the Crook Commission remained in 
Lakota territory from May 31 through August 
7. Crook tried a softer approach, putting on 
feasts and allowing tribal dances that church-
nominated agents had prohibited on the res-
ervations. But Crook's message was the same 
as Pratt's had been: Congress will open the 
reservations with' or without your approval, so 
you are better off accepting this more generous 
agreement. Crook promised to try to improve 
the rations, increase the wages of Indian police 
and judges, and secure better enforcement of 
regulations prohibiting non-Indians from graz-
ing their herds on Indian land. Subtly using 
food as a weapon, Crook required Indians who 
refused to sign to remain at Standing Rock 
until agreement was reached-forcing them to 
remain away from their fields and food crops 
all summer. Ultimately the necessary three-
fourths of household heads signed, the first 
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being Luther Standing Bear's father, Standing 
Bear. The Lakota men voted 4,463 out of 5,678 
eligible to vote to accept Congress's fait accom-
pli.63 The Great Sioux Reservation was broken 
up into the Standing Rock and Cheyenne 
River reservations in the north; Pine Ridge, 
Rosebud, and Lower Brule to the south; and, 
on the east bank of the Missouri, the Yankton 
and Crow Creek.64 
They were not told that the U.S. government 
had already decided to cut rations to Lakotas at 
Pine Ridge and Rosebud by 20 to 25 percent 
for the coming year, which brought an angry 
delegation from the agencies to Washington 
to meet with the secretary of the interior in 
futile protest. That winter of 1889-90 was an 
especially hard winter, and in February the 
president declared remaining Sioux land open 
for settlement.6S 
Historian Henry Fritz speculated that the 
huge reservations could have been converted 
to profitable ranches and Indians could have 
been helped to form stock-raising associations, 
but instead Indian land was drastically reduced 
in size and Indians were al.1otted 160-acre tracts 
that could not support farming and were too 
small to support ranching. As this became 
evident in the following decade, most of the 
Christian reformers shifted their position, 
still supporting allotment but arguing that the 
reservation system itself was holding Indians 
back; many of them escalated efforts to make 
Indians full citizens and to end their depen-
dency on the federal government.66 
WOUNDED KNEE: DECEMBER 1890 
By the fall of 1890, Charles Eastman had com-
pleted medical school and was now Dr. Charles 
Eastman, government physician to the Lakota 
reservation at Pine Ridge in South Dakota. He 
was one of the first Native American reservation 
physicians, along with Mohave Apache Dr. Carlos 
Montezuma and Omaha Dr. Susan La Flesche 
Picotte. 67 Eastman arrived at Pine Ridge shortly 
after a new agent arrived, political appointee Dr. 
Daniel Royer, who replaced the popular agent 
Valentine McGillycuddy.68 The new, inexperi-
enced Agent Royer would call in the army to stop 
the Ghost Dance religious revival, misreading it 
as evidence that the Lakota were about to resume 
warfare against whites. 
Another newcomer to Pine Ridge Agency that 
fall was twenty-seven-year-old Elaine Goodale of 
Massachusetts, supervisor of the sixty Sioux day 
schools and a teacher who had traveled among 
the Sioux. She knew about the Ghost Dance and 
had interviewed an Indian man who had met 
the prophet Wovoka, who started the religious 
movement that was sweeping across the West. At 
Pine Ridge Miss Goodale met Dr. Eastman, the 
new reservation physician. Together they tried to 
educate Agent Royer to what the drumming and 
dancing really meant. Together they celebrated 
Christmas. Together they heard the army firing on 
the civilian Indian ghost dancers on December 29, 
1890, killing between 200 and 300. Together they 
cared for the injured in the agency chapel-cum-
hospital. Amidst the chaos of the Wounded Knee 
Massacre they became vocal critics of the agent's 
use of a military response against despairing civil-
ians who were engaging in a widespread religious 
revival. Their outrage fed the love developing 
between them. Within six months Elaine Goodale 
and Charles Eastman married.69 Their continued 
published and unpublished criticism of corrup-
tion on the reservations-of traders cheating the 
Indians with shoddy goods or fewer goods than 
they were paid to provide and of ignorant politi-
cal appointees using agency jobs solely to advance 
their careers-would ultimately end Charles's 
career as a reservation physician.7o 
The military response to the Ghost Dance 
at Pine Ridge Reservation demoralized even 
those Lakota who supported assimilation as 
the wisest response under the circumstances. 
Luther Standing Bear, a graduate of Carlisle 
Indian Industrial School who had returned to 
the reservation to raise his family, wrote about 
the Wounded Knee Massacre: 
Men, women, and children-even babies 
were killed in their mothers' arms! ... [Ilt 
was not a battle-it was a slaughter, a massa-
cre. Those soldiers had been sent to protect 
these men, women, and children who had 
not joined the ghost dancers, but they had 
shot them down without even a chance to 
defend themselves. When I heard this, it 
made my blood boil. I was ready myself to go 
and fight then. There I was, doing my best to 
teach my people to follow in the white men's 
road-even trying to get them to believe in 
their religion-and this was my reward for 
it all! The very people I was following-and 
getting my people to follow-had no respect 
for motherhood, old age, or babyhood. 
Where was all their civilized training?71 
Gen. Nelson Miles shared the dismay of Luther 
Standing Bear, Elaine Goodale, and Charles 
Eastman at the military's behavior at Wounded 
Knee, writing in a letter eleven months after 
the massacre: 
Wholesale massacre occurred and I have 
never heard of a more brutal, cold blooded 
massacre than that at Wounded Knee. 
About two hundred women and children 
were killed and wounded; women with little 
children on their backs, and small children 
powder burned by the men who killed 
them, being so near as to burn the flesh and 
clothing with the powder of their guns, and 
nursing babes with five bullet holes through 
themP 
The year 1890 ended with Wounded Knee 
and with a surprising announcement from the 
superintendent of the'census, chief executive at 
the Census Bureau: 
Up to and including 1880, the country had 
a frontier of settlement, but at present the 
unsettled area has been so broken into by 
isolated bodies of settlement that there can 
hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the 
discussion of its extent, its westward move-
ment, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer 
have a place in the census reportsJ3 
The Great Plains, according to the U.S. 
government's Census Bureau, had no more 
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room for native peoples to settle other than 
the barren areas assigned to them. It was the 
beginning of a new era. 
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